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Abstract
Background: Co-existence of the cultivation of genetically modified and non-genetically modified crops is
commonly regarded as a suitable way out of the clash of perceptions of environmental or health risks of
genetically modified organisms. It allows setting aside a clear risk-based decision for or against genetically modified
organisms, because all types of agriculture shall be given the possibility to exist side by side.
Still, co-existence entails conflicts which the law strives to solve. European Union law is reticent as to binding co-
existence measures and has left this task to the member states. Taking Germany as a case, the established rules
have not been effective because they shift conflict resolution to the local and individual level. A systemic approach
suggests the use of landscape planning as a means of clustering different kinds of agriculture.
Methods: The pertinent European Union and German law is summarised and interpreted. Its effects are analysed
and explained. From this reform, suggestions are derived.
Results: According to the European Union, conception measures aiming at reducing health and environmental
risks of genetically modified organisms must be separated from measures aiming at ensuring the economic co-
existence of different kinds of agriculture. In contrast, German law on gene technology does not precisely separate
risk mitigation measures from co-existence measures. The measures all aim at solving the conflicts between the
individual landowners and thus fail to recognise the systemic character of the conflict between agricultures. The
systemic conflict can better be solved by non-binding landscape planning or a legally binding agrarian utilisation
plan, yet to be developed. Legislation addressing the conflict of agriculture must respect its constitutional
dimension, i.e. the clash of basic rights to property and entrepreneurial freedom of conventional, organic and
genetically modified organism farmers, industry, commerce and consumers. Binding and non-binding planning
measures are compatible with constitutional guarantees as well as with European Union law
Conclusions: Co-existence and freedom of choice between the different agricultures is not effectively achieved by
the existing individual solutions. Binding agricultural planning should therefore be introduced establishing e.g.
genetically modified organism-free zones. Such measures are compatible with constitutional guarantees and with
EU law.
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Background
EU law
A European Commission Recommendation of 2003 sets
out guidelines for the development of national strategies
and best practices to ensure the co-existence of geneti-
cally modified organism (GMO) agriculture with con-
ventional and organic farming [1]. The aim of the
recommendation is to ensure that agricultural methods
not using GMOs shall persist side by side with GMO-
based methods [2]. Co-existence shall ensure that farm-
ers, industry, commerce and consumers have a free
choice between conventional, organic and GMO crops
[3]. This definition of co-existence shows that the basic
idea of co-existence is the economic concern, not how-
ever environmental and health risks, as being empha-
sised by the traditional GMO law. The latter is dealt
with by Directive 2001/18/EC [4] on the deliberate
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release of GMOs and Regulation 1829/03 [5] on geneti-
cally modified food and feed including seed (IT is con-
troversial whether seed is comprised by the Regulation.
However, it is common practice) [6]. Article 4 of the
Directive states that the granting of an authorisation for
the deliberate release of a GMO shall only be given, if a
comprehensive risk assessment shows that there are no
risks to the environment or health, or that the existing
risks can be managed by appropriate measures, within
the framework of risk management [7]. The same is
done by Art. 4 of Regulation 1829/03. Separated from
this risk-based approach, co-existence (even though it
should implicitly serve to minimise environmental or
health risks, too) aims at the protection of real assets:
the possibility to sell products as GMO free.
Proposal for amending the relevant EU law
In July 2010, the Commission released a new Recom-
mendation [8] on guidelines for the development of
national co-existence measures to avoid the unintended
presence of GMOs in conventional and organic crops,
replacing the above mentioned Recommendation 2003/
556/EC of 23rd July 2003. It emphasizes inter alia the
importance of making a clear distinction between health
and environmental risks and promulgates the legitimacy
of agricultural planning (including GMO-free regions).
Moreover, the Commission proposed an amendment [9]
to Directive 2001/18/EC recommending the inclusion of
a new Article 26b to the Directive. According to this
article, the decision whether GMOs may be cultivated
or not is left to the member states (restricted however
only to such reasons being not already taken into
account in the risk analysis). As to the amendment of
Directive 2001/18/EC, the European Parliament and the
Council have not yet decided. Nevertheless, the mere
proposal allows conclusions with regard to the future
development of national co-existence regulations.
German law
Both aspects, risk assessment and co-existence, are
implemented in the German Genetic Engineering Act
(GenTG) [10]. Section 1 GenTG defines the aim of the
law as to prevent risks to environment and health (Sec-
tion 1 No. 1) and to ensure co-existence (Section 1 No.
2). However, the measures provided for these aims do
not draw a clear line between the two concerns. For
instance, the public register of sites of GMO agriculture
required by Section 16a GenTG is designed to serve the
double purpose of monitoring any possible risks to the
environment and human health as well as ensuring co-
existence. In the same vein the rules on good practice
[11] define distance requirements between GMO and
non-GMO crops to prevent on the one hand the con-
tamination of neighbouring fields (thus protecting
economic concerns of the non-GMO farmer) and on
the other hand the presence of transgens in wildflowers
(thus preventing environmental risks, c.f. Section 16b (3)
No. 2 GenTG).
This intermixture of aims is reasonable because it
helps to simplify administrative control. However, what
is commanded by the two aims should be distinguished
in the first place in order to finally find the optimal
measure for both. For instance, economic reasons might
call for much greater distance requirements than purely
ecological ones because the simple presence of GMOs
in a pollinated plant can entail an economic loss but not
yet an ecological risk.
We concentrate on co-existence measures aiming at
the economic aspect. Our question is if farmers effec-
tively have the freedom of choice between conventional,
organic and GMO crop production, and if not, what can
be done about it.
Results
Measures of co-existence as laid down by German law
(Sections 16a and 36a Act GenTG) and good practice
rules (c.f. [11]) include the register on GMO release
(Section 16a GenTG), duties of GMO farmers to inform
neighbours of planned GMO release (Cf. Sections 16b
(5), 18 (2) and 21 GenTG - duty to inform the authori-
ties and participation of the public; Section 35 GenTG -
duty to inform the injured party, as well as Section 3
GenTPfEV(Regulation on the Production of Genetically
Modified Crops) - duty to inform the neighbour prior to
the planting of GMO), distance rules for planting like
GMO and non-GMO crops (Annex to GenTPfEV, spe-
cific rules for plants), and liability for the contamination
of neighbouring crops (Section 36a GenTG). All of
these measures aim at solving conflicts between the
individual landowners. In the nationwide register on
GMO releases, information is displayed about the GMO
(its name and characteristics), the property on which it
will be released, the period in which it shall be culti-
vated and if applicable the name of the person farming
the plot of land. The GMO farmer has to register the
required information prior to cultivation (Section 16a
(2) and (3) GenTG). The register is open to the public
as far as the characteristics and the plot of land on
which the GMO will be cultivated are concerned (Sec-
tion 16a (1) sentence 3, in conjunction with (4)
GenTG). Additional prior information duties rest upon
the GMO farmer as he is obliged to inform his neigh-
bour about the cultivation of GMOs at least 3 months
prior to the cultivation (Section 3 (1) GenTPflEV). In
case the GMO farmer does not get any response from
the neighbour within 1 month after receipt, he can
assume that the neighbour does not cultivate plants of
the same kind as the GMO or able to cross out with it
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(Section 3 (2) GenTPflEV). If such plants are cultivated
on neighbouring fields, the GMO farmer is obliged to
meet the minimum distance requirements set out in the
annex to the GenTPflEV (Section 4 GenTPflEV). Until
now, only distance rules for GMO maize have been laid
down. One hundred and fifty meters are required for
the distance between GMO and conventional maize and
300 m for GMO and organic maize. In case the land-
owner complies with these regulations and the crops of
the neighbour are nevertheless contaminated, although
the crop was be labelled as GMO based or cannot be
labelled as GMO free, the GMO farmer is liable for the
damage arising out of this contamination (Section 906
Civil Law Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - BGB)
together with Section 36a GenTG). The damage is cal-
culated according to the impairment of saleability of the
product as GMO free. In case the landowner complies
with these regulations but the crops of the neighbour
are nevertheless contaminated, the GMO farmer is liable
for the damage arising out of the contamination, i.e.
damage which the neighbour has to face because he
must label his crops as GMO based or cannot label
them GMO free.
The said legal measures strive for solving the conflict
between agricultures on the local and individual level.
The neighbouring farmers are expected to be able to
come to an agreement. However, such individual con-
flict solutions are bound to fail for social and ecological
reasons:
1. The information and coordination duties might be
disrespected in the actual farming practice, because
GMO farmers find them too burdensome, or the
conventional farmers do not know or defend their
rights, or, more fundamentally, because on the vil-
lage level social rules and power structures prevail
over legal rights and duties (in Spain, for instance, it
was reported that many organic farmers “voluntarily”
gave up because they did not see a chance to persist
in a local culture and practice of GMO cultivation)
[12].
2. The existing liability rules are limited to neigh-
bours. This excludes farmers operating on distant
plots as well as non-agricultural actors such as bee-
keepers [13].
3. The rules on minimum distances have the effect
that in regions with small agricultural plots much
land must be reserved - and wasted - for puffer
functions.
An alternative approach should take into account that
GMO agriculture is not a problem between single farm-
ers but rather a conflict between entire statures of agri-
culture. This systemic character of the problem
necessitates systemic measures. One measure could be
landscape planning, another one the strengthening of
multilateral voluntary agreements between landowners
of a region.
Landscape planning
Taking Germany as a case landscape planning is aimed
at (1) describing the present state and uses of natural
areas and landscapes, (2) defining objectives of nature
protection and landscape preservation, (3) evaluate the
factual situation and (4) elaborate measures in view of
the defined objectives (Section 9 (3) Federal Nature Pro-
tection Act (Bundesnaturschutzgesetz - BNatSchG)).
According to the law, measures shall protect nature and
landscape against damage (Section 9 (3) No. 4 (a)
BNatSchG), but they can also be employed to preserve
and develop the diversity, originality (Eigenart) and ame-
nity of nature and landscape (Section 9 (3) No. 4 (f)
BNatSchG).
The authors submit that the determination of areas
where no GMOs shall be introduced can be one mea-
sure of this latter kind (concurring with this opinion,
see [14]). For instance, the landscape plans could pro-
mulgate GMO-free regions, regions for organic produc-
tion, regions recommended for GMO cultivation, etc.
Such use of landscape planning would be compatible
with the already cited Commission Communication
where it is said that “measures of a regional dimension
could be considered. Such measures should apply only
to specific crops whose cultivation would be incompati-
ble with co-existence, and their geographical scale
should be as limited as possible.”[15]
When considering landscape planning as a tool of co-
existence, it must however be noted that according to
most German Länder laws landscape, plans are only
binding in the internal administrative sphere. They do
not create rights and duties of citizens. Nevertheless,
even as a non-binding document, they can provide gui-
dance for farmers.
Voluntary multilateral agreements
Voluntary multilateral agreements between the land-
owners are another method to arrange co-existence.
They are mainly used to build up GMO-free regions.
The attached map shows the present distribution of
GMO-free regions in Germany (Figure 1; http://www.
gmo-free-regions.org/gmo-free-regions/germany.html)
Of course, they can also be used for regions recom-
mended for GMO production or regions for organic
production.
Even though such agreements are binding for the par-
ties, they do normally not encompass any sanctions in
cases where a party does not comply with the agree-
ment. Moreover, they are not binding for the successors
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in landownership because the agreements usually are
not secured by a servitude on the real estate.
As outlined, neither landscape planning nor voluntary
agreements result in binding law. More effective solu-
tions can be found in binding agricultural planning. In
terms of legislative technique, three options are possible.
Either the BNatSchG could be amended to open up
landscape planning for agricultural planning and make it
binding in that respect, or agricultural planning con-
cerning GMOs could be included into the GenTG, or a
separate law on agricultural planning could be designed.
Besides ensuring co-existence, such planning could at
the same time enhance environmental risk reduction. In
the German case, it could be based on the competence
for nature and landscape protection (Art. 74 No. 29
Grundgesetz) as well as the competence for support for
agricultural production (Art. 74 No. 17 Grundgesetz).
Discussion
Compatibility of the co-existence measures with
constitutional guarantees
Any measure trying to solve the conflict between GMO
and non-GMO farmers, may it address the individual or
the systemic conflict, raises questions of its compatibility
with constitutional guarantees, and especially the protec-
tion of private property. The property guarantee could
be affected:
1. because the GMO farmer must register his crop,
keep the prescribed distances to non-GMO fields,
compensate damages and - if introduced - obey the
agricultural planning;
2. because the non-GMO farmer must tolerate a cer-
tain amount of contamination by GMO pollen, bears
the burden of proof with regard to economical
damages through a GMO farmer and is compen-
sated only under rather restrictive conditions (See
Section 36a GenTG)a
The following analysis concentrates on case 1 (GMO
farmer) and only takes into account German constitu-
tional law. A recent judgement of the German Federal
Constitutional Court supports our views [16].
Property, as guaranteed by Art. 14 Grundgesetz (GG),
means the right of use and disposal of all assets belong-
ing to an individual. Hence, it includes the free choice
of seeds for cultivation by a farmer. Restricting this
choice by notification and compensation duties is an
intervention into his property right. However, any prop-
erty is subject to the moulding and limitations defined
by the legislator in view of the public interest (Art. 14
(1) GG). While there is broad discretion of the legislator
to define the extension of the protected property and to
limit its uses, the legislator must respect the core func-
tions of private property (called institutional guarantee
in German constitutional doctrine) such as securing pri-
vate goods for an individual’s self-fulfilment. In addition,
the intervention into private property must obey the
proportionality principle. An expropriation is only possi-
ble if necessary to satisfy an imperative public interest
and adequate compensation is provided.
Subsuming the case of the GMO farmer under these
rules, it is clear from the outset that the restrictions do
not amount to an expropriation. Moreover, the core
functions of the property guarantee are not affected
because the farmer’s business, not his personal develop-
ment, is at stake.
The public interest justifying the intervention can be
found in the very objective of co-existence of different
kinds of agriculture. In particular, there is a public inter-
est to allow non-GMO farmers to carry on and provide
non-GMO food for those consumers who have a prefer-
ence for non-GMO food. This public interest is even
backed by constitutional rights of property of third par-
ties. This includes the property right of the non-GMO
farmer, i.e. to be protected against contamination and to
freely use his property for non-GMO cultivation.b It
may also include the personal freedom of consumers to
have a free choice of goods between GMO and non-
GMO products.
Proportionality further demands (amongst others) to
check that no less restrictive measures could have been
used to satisfy the public interest. Voluntary cooperation
between farmers may be considered as an option.
Figure 1 Map of GMO-free regions Germany 2010.
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However, they would not solve situations where no con-
sensus can be obtained. Therefore binding measures are
unavoidable. As to whether individual or systemic mea-
sures should prevail the shifting of conflict resolution to
the local and individual level appears to be less restric-
tive than binding agricultural planning. But, as shown
above, individual measures do not effectively ensure co-
existence. For instance, given the fact that pollen is
transported over long distances, land corridors around
GMO fields may fail to separate productions over the
long term. Therefore, also binding measures would pass
the test of proportionality.
Compatibility of measures with EU law
It must further be analysed, whether binding agricultural
planning defining regions where GMOs can be cultivated
and where not would infringe EU law. According to Art.
22 Directive 2001/18/EC “Member States may not prohi-
bit, restrict or impede the placing on the market of
GMOs, as or in products, which comply with the require-
ments of this Directive.” This provision is breached if the
designation of GMO-free regions must be considered as
an impediment of the placing on the market of the
genetically modified seed. The answer is in the negative
because the designation would be concerned with the use
of the GMO. The GMO could still be freely sold and pur-
chased on the market. This could be different if the
whole territory of a member state would be closed for
GMO application. Then, the placing on the market
would be impeded de facto because of low demand for
the seed.c However, GMO-free regions are not supposed
to cover the entire territory of a member state.
Assumed that the designation of GMO-free regions
would nevertheless be considered as an impediment to
the placing on the market of the seed, a member state
could make use of its right under Art. 114 (5) Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This
provision allows member states to introduce legislation
which goes further than the EU legal act in protecting
human health and the environment, but only if new
scientific findings on risks and a new problem specific to
the member state advise accordingly. The European
Courts ruled on this question in the case of GMOs in the
Land Upper Austria (Oberösterreich) [17]. The Land had
drafted a regulation prohibiting any cultivation of GMO
plants in its entire territory. The Republic of Austria
asked the commission for approval according to Art. 95
(5) TEU (now Art. 114 (5) TFEU) arguing that the regu-
lation was destined to protect small-scale farming and
the unique nature in Oberösterreich. The commission
decided that the prerequisites - new scientific findings on
risks and a specific problem of the member state - were
not given. The Republic of Austria appealed against this
decision at the European Court of First Instance.
The Court subscribed to the view of the commission
mainly based on the grounds that small-sized farms
were not a specific problem of Austria, and that the
concerned ecosystems were not unique. Therefore, it
did not regard it necessary to decide whether the men-
tioned scientific findings were new. Based on these
grounds, the court decided that the legal provision of
the Republic of Austria infringed EU law. Upon appeal,
the ECJ upheld this decision.
In relation to binding agrarian planning as here pro-
posed, the question arises if establishing GMO-free
zones would - according to this jurisprudence - be com-
patible with Art. 114 TFEU. We submit that this is the
case [18]. We are of the opinion that the European
Courts held only those measures inadmissible which
concerned the whole territory of a member state region.
By contrast, measures of a local character based on rea-
sonable grounds (like co-existence) are not even cap-
tured by the scope of application of Art. 114 (5) TFEU.
They do not go further than EU law because the author-
ization for the bringing on the market of a GMO does
not preclude the regulation of uses at the spot. Likewise,
for instance, the authorization of the placing on the
market of a pesticide does not exclude that a member
state prohibits the usage of pesticides in water or nature
protection areas. The authorization under Directive
2001/18/EC does not mean that the GMO has to be
used everywhere. Of course, such measures may not be
so extensive that this amounts to a de facto moratorium
of the placing on the market of GMOs (see Endnote c).
Conclusions
Co-existence and freedom of choice between the differ-
ent agricultures is not effectively achieved by the exist-
ing individual solutions to the conflict. Agricultural
planning should therefore be introduced establishing, e.
g. GMO-free zones. As outlined, neither landscape plan-
ning nor voluntary agreements result in binding law.
More effective solutions can be found in binding agri-
cultural planning. Such measures are compatible with
constitutional guarantees as well as with EU law.
Methods
The pertinent EU and German law of the EU and of
Germany is analysed using the common methodology of
law interpretation. Effects of the law are predicted and
explained by educated guess. On that basis, reform pro-
posals are developed and tested as to possible conflicts
with constitutional guarantees following the methodol-
ogy of application of basic rights.
Endnotes
aAn example for the limited protection by Section 36a
GenTG are beekeepers. They have to face the problem
Winter and Stoppe-Ramadan Environmental Sciences Europe 2011, 23:28
http://www.enveurope.com/content/23/1/28
Page 5 of 6
of their honey getting contaminated with GMO pollen.
In the case of Brandenburg for example, pollen of the
maize MON 810 was found in the honey. The beekeeper
applied for appropriate measures of the competent
administrative body to avoid contact of his bees with
the said maize pollen. The judge agreed in the fact that
beekeepers come into a hopeless situation if the deliber-
ate release of GMOs is expanding; however, it is for the
legislator to find a solution to this problem. Until now,
beekeepers are not considered by the liability rules of
the GenTG. Yet, a duty to encompass them can be con-
cluded by looking at the Commission’s recommendation
that all member states should analyse their liability rules
on whether they consider all affected parties.
bThis reasoning was recently sustained by the German
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht)
in its judgement of 27 November 2010, Case 1 BvF 2/
05, n.y.r..
cThis construction has recently been developed by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ), see judgement of 10
February 2009, case C-110/05 (Motorcycles), E.C.R.
2009, I-519, No. 56 f. and judgement of 4 June 2009,
case C-142/05 (Mickelsson), E.C.R., No. 24.
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